Incentive Effects of Peer Pressure in Organizations by Kohei Daido
Incentive Effects of Peer Pressure in Organizations 
Kohei Daido
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of peer pressure on incentives. We assume that, in addition to
the material payoff, each agent's utility includes the psychological payoff from peer pressure
generated by a comparison of effort costs. We show that the optimal incentive schemes
depend mainly on the degree of peer pressure and of the heterogeneity of agents.
Furthermore, we examine the optimal organizational forms in terms of the principal's
intention to make use of the effects of peer pressure.
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This paper studies optimal incentive schemes when agents feel peer pressure. Here, peer
pressure implies a psychological pressure that an agent feels when he compares his eﬀort
cost with that of his colleague’s. Some literature has studied the eﬀects of peer pressure on
incentives and, most often, assumed that an agent feels peer pressure through a comparison
between his actions and that of his colleague’s.1 This kind of comparison seems to be realistic
and natural, so research based on this assumption is valuable in some situations. However,
in other situations, it is natural to assume that the source of peer pressure is the comparison
of action costs rather than the actions themselves. In particular, this aspect is crucial if we
consider that agents are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities. This paper shows that
peer pressure and heterogeneity have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the optimal incentive scheme even
if we consider a simple situation where each agent has only two available actions: work or
shirk.
We consider the following situation. There are two risk-neutral agents protected by limited
liability constraints. Each agent contributes eﬀort towards a single output. The principal can
observe only the output so that the reward to each agent is contingent on this output. Two
agents are heterogeneous with respect to their eﬀort costs. In addition to the material payoﬀ,
each agent’s utility includes the psychological payoﬀ generated by a comparison between his
eﬀort cost and his colleague’s. In this situation, we study optimal incentive schemes and show
that such schemes depend mainly on the degree of peer pressure and that of the heterogeneity
of the agents. Additionally, we study whether the principal can save the payment to the agents
by making use of the eﬀects of peer pressure. From this viewpoint, we give a brief discussion
on the design of the organizational forms.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. The model is presented in the next
section. Section 3 shows the principal’s problem and derives the optimal incentive schemes.
We compare the optimal incentives between the case with peer pressure and that without it
in section 4 and examine the optimal organizational forms in section 5. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in section 6.
2 The Model
Consider a situation in which there is a principal and two agents, denoted by i = 1;2. They
are assumed to be risk-neutral, but the agents are protected by limited liability constraints.
Each agent chooses his eﬀort level ei 2 f0;1g. Let e e e = (e1;e2) denote the vector of agents’
eﬀort levels. Agent i devotes his eﬀort at cost di(ei). For simplicity, we assume that di(1) = di,
di(0) = 0, and 0 < d1 < d2. Thus, the heterogeneity between the agents is caused by the
diﬀerence between the eﬀort costs. Assume that agent 2 is a “less productive agent” and
agent 1 is a “more productive agent”. We assume that the principal knows each agent’s eﬀort
1See, for example, Kandel and Lazear (1992), Barron and Gjerde (1997), and Daido (2004, 2005).
1costs. The realized output, b, depends on the eﬀort level of the agents in the following way.
The project succeeds with probability p(e e e) and its output is bs while it fails with probability
1 ¡ p(e e e) and its output is bf. We assume bs = b > 0 and bf = 0. The probability p(e e e)
depends on e e e. p(e e e) = ph if both agents choose ei = 1, p(e e e) = pl if one agent chooses ei = 1
but the other agent chooses e¡i = 0, and p(e e e) = p if both agents choose ei = 0. We assume
0 < p < pl < ph < 1. The principal can observe only this veriﬁable output so that the reward





i represents the payment to agent i when the project succeeds and w
f
i represents the
payment to agent i when the project fails. Note that wn
i ¸ 0, for i = 1;2 and n = s;f,
because we consider the limited liability constraints.
In order to incorporate peer pressure into this model, we consider the following utility
function for agent i.
ui = p(e e e)w
s
i + (1 ¡ p(e e e))w
f
i ¡ di(ei) ¡ ® ¢ maxf°(di ¡ d¡i);d¡i ¡ dig (1)
The ﬁnal term represents a peer pressure function: the agent feels peer pressure when his
eﬀort cost diﬀers from that of his colleague. We assume that 0 < ® and 0 < ° · 1. ® is
the degree of peer pressure and ° is the coeﬃcient that represents the degree of the reduction
of peer pressure when an agent’s eﬀort cost is above his colleague’s, relative to the inverse
case. The most signiﬁcant assumption for this peer pressure function is that each agent feels
peer pressure not only when his eﬀort cost is below his colleague’s level but also when it is
above that level. In addition, when ° < 1, the agent feels less pressure when his eﬀort cost
is above his colleague’s level than when it is below that level.2 Because the heterogeneity of
the productivity of the agents is the main feature of this paper, we assume that the source of
peer pressure is the comparison of eﬀort costs rather than eﬀort levels.3
Certain assumptions in this model appear to be strict. The assumptions that peer pressure
comes from the comparison of eﬀort costs and that agents can take two actions are crucial to
the results obtained the following analysis. However, we can develop a simple model under
these assumptions so that we are able to interpret the optimal incentive schemes in terms of
heterogeneity (d2=d1), the degree of peer pressure (®), and the coeﬃcient of the reduction of
peer pressure (°).
The timing is as follows. First, the principal oﬀers a contract to the agents. Then, the
agents decide simultaneously whether to accept or reject the contract. If rejected by at least
one agent, the game ends and each agent receives the reservation utility, which is assumed to
be zero. If accepted by both agents, the game proceeds to the next stage. Next, each agent
chooses his own eﬀort level. Finally, output is realized and the principal pays wages to the
agents according to the contract.
2We can usually see this kind of assumption in studies on the other-regarding preferences, such as Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Itoh (2004).
3Daido (2006) also studied the eﬀects of peer pressure on incentives. He assumes that two agents feel peer
pressure through comparison of eﬀort levels and deﬁnes a quadratic peer pressure function where the agents’
eﬀort levels are continuous.
23 The Optimal Incentive Schemes
To begin with, we consider the case without peer pressure as the benchmark.4 In this situation,
the utility functions of agent i and the principal are ui = p(e e e)ws
i + (1 ¡ p(e e e))w
f
i ¡ di(ei) and
uP = p(e e e)b ¡
P
ifp(e e e)ws
i + (1 ¡ p(e e e))w
f
i g, respectively. We assume that b is so large that the
principal wants to implement e e e = (1;1). The agent i’s incentive compatibility constraint and
participation constraint are as follows:5




h∆i ¸ di (PCi)
where ∆p ´ ph ¡ pl and ∆i ´ ws
i ¡ w
f
i . The principal oﬀers a contract that minimizes the





i g, subject to (ICi), (PCi), and the limited
liability constraints.
We can readily ﬁnd the optimal contract (ws¤
i ;w
f¤
i ) in this case. If (ws
i;w
f
i ) that (PCi)
holds with equality also satisﬁes (ICi), then the ﬁrst-best contract can be achieved. To check
this, substituting ∆i = (di ¡ w
f
i )=ph into (ICi), we obtain (di ¡ w
f
i )=ph ¸ di=∆p. Because
ph > ∆p, this inequality is violated even when w
f
i = 0. That is, the ﬁrst-best contract cannot
be achieved and the optimal contract is the second-best one where (ICi) binds, ∆i = di=∆p.
Then, the payment to agent i is w
f
i + phdi=∆p. To minimize this payment under the limited
liability constraint, w
f¤
i = 0 and ws¤
i = di=∆p. Thus, the optimal contract in the case without
peer pressure is (ws¤
i ;w
f¤
i ) = (di=∆p;0).
Next, we consider the case with peer pressure. Each agent’s incentive compatibility and




h∆1 ¡ d1 ¡ ®(d2 ¡ d1) ¸ w
f
1 + p




h∆2 ¡ d2 ¡ ®°(d2 ¡ d1) ¸ w
f
2 + p








h∆2 ¡ d2 ¡ ®°(d2 ¡ d1) ¸ 0: (PC2p)
First, consider the optimal contract for agent 2. Suppose (PC2p) binds, ∆2 = fd2+®°(d2¡
d1)¡w
f
2g=ph. Substituting this equation into (IC2p), we obtain fd2+®°(d2¡d1)¡w
f
2g=ph ¸
4We can consider this case as if there is a single agent because there do not exist any correlations between
two agents in the production process. Itoh (2003) is helpful in identifying optimal contracts in this case.
5(ICi) and (PCi) represent the incentive compatibility and participation constraints for agent i in the case
without peer pressure, respectively.
6(ICip) and (PCip) represent the incentive compatibility and participation constraints for agent i in the






2 = 0, this inequality is most feasible. Then, we have
the following condition under which the ﬁrst-best is achieved.
d2 + ®°(d2 ¡ d1)
ph ¸
d2 + ®f°d2 ¡ (1 + °)d1g
∆p
(2)
Then, the optimal contract ( ¯ ws
2; ¯ w
f




2) = (fd2 + ®°(d2 ¡ d1)g=ph;0) exists as an optimal contract.
On the other hand, if the condition (2) cannot be satisﬁed, the optimal contract is the









d2 + ®f°d2 ¡ (1 + °)d1g
¤
=∆p: (3)
It is obvious that the principal can minimize the payment by ensuring w
f
2 = 0. Thus, the
second-best optimal contract is: ( ¯ ws¤
2 ; ¯ w
f¤
2 ) = (
£
d2 + ®f°d2 ¡ (1 + °)d1g
¤
=∆p;0).
Next, consider the optimal contract for agent 1. The method of identifying such a contract
is the same as for agent 2. The condition under which the ﬁrst-best is achieved is as follows.





Then, the optimal contract ( ¯ ws
1; ¯ w
f




1) = (fd1 + ®(d2 ¡ d1)g=ph;0) exists as an optimal contract. Note that (4) is always
satisﬁed if 1 · ®. On the other hand, if the condition (4) cannot be satisﬁed, the optimal








h(1 ¡ ®)d1=∆p: (5)
Then, the second-best optimal contract is: ( ¯ ws¤
1 ; ¯ w
f¤
1 ) = ((1 ¡ ®)d1=∆p;0).














where l ´ pl=ph. Because d1 < d2, we can summarize the optimal contracts as the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal contracts are classiﬁed as follows.
4(i) When ® < l, the optimal contract for agent 1 is ( ¯ ws
1; ¯ w
f
1) when (7) is satisﬁed, otherwise
it is ( ¯ ws¤
1 ; ¯ w
f¤
1 ), and the optimal contract for agent 2 is ( ¯ ws¤
2 ; ¯ w
f¤
2 ).
(ii) When l < ®, the optimal contract for agent 1 is ( ¯ ws
1; ¯ w
f
1), and the optimal contract for
agent 2 is ( ¯ ws
2; ¯ w
f
2) when (6) is satisﬁed, otherwise it is ( ¯ ws¤
2 ; ¯ w
f¤
2 ).
(iii) When ® = l, the optimal contract for agent 1 is ( ¯ ws
1; ¯ w
f
1) and the optimal contract for
agent 2 is ( ¯ ws¤
2 ; ¯ w
f¤
2 )
This proposition shows that the optimal incentive scheme depends on certain parame-
ters that determine whether the incentive compatibility constraint or participation constraint
binds. From (6) and (7), we can see the eﬀects of such parameters on the incentives.
Firstly, the higher the degree of heterogeneity (d2=d1), the higher the possibility that
(PC1p) rather than (IC1p), and (IC2p) rather than (PC2p) are binding. That is, when the
heterogeneity is signiﬁcant, the principal has no need to pay any rent to the more productive
agent whereas she does have to pay rent to the less productive one. For the more productive
agent, his eﬀort cost is below his colleague’s not only when he does not devote eﬀort but also
when he does. In this case, he can reduce the negative externality of peer pressure by devoting
eﬀort. This reduction is then large, as the heterogeneity is signiﬁcant. As a result, he is willing
to devote his eﬀort with no rent. On the other hand, the less productive agent’s eﬀort cost is
above his colleague’s when he devotes eﬀort while his eﬀort cost is below his colleague’s when
he does not devote eﬀort. Although he can also reduce negative externalities by devoting
eﬀort, this eﬀect is relatively weak as the degree of heterogeneity is high. Consequently, the
principal has to pay rent to him in order to induce him to exert eﬀort.
Secondly, the higher the degree of the reduction of peer pressure when an agent’s eﬀort
cost is above his colleague’s (°), the higher the possibility that (IC2p) rather than (PC2p) are
binding. Note that ° aﬀects the incentive only for the less productive agent because the more
productive agent’s eﬀort cost is never above the less productive agent’s cost. If ° is small,
then, for the less productive agent, the negative externality of peer pressure from devoting
his eﬀort becomes small. Then, (PC2p) rather than (IC2p) tends to be binding. However, as
° is large, the negative externality of peer pressure is signiﬁcant even if he devotes eﬀort. In
this case, the principal has to provide him with incentives so that (IC2p) rather than (PC2p)
becomes more stringent.
Finally, the higher the degree of peer pressure (®), the higher the possibility that both
agents’ participation constraints are more eﬀective than their incentive compatibility con-
straints.7 That is, when peer pressure is signiﬁcant, the principal does not need to pay any
rent to both agents. We can see this result easily from the fact that the negative externality
by not devoting eﬀort is large when peer pressure is signiﬁcant.
7Note that, for agent 2, the same eﬀect works as l decreases. For agent 1, this is true if ® < 1. As
mentioned above, (PC1p) is always binding when 1 · ®.
54 The Eﬀects of Peer Pressure on Incentives
As seen previously, in contrast to the case without peer pressure, the principal no longer
suﬀers from the agency problem in some cases with peer pressure. However, if ® < l and
d2=d1 < 1 + (l ¡ ®)=®(1 ¡ l), then both agents’ incentive compatibility constraints bind.
Thus, in this case, the agency problem remains even if the eﬀects of peer pressure exist. Here,
in order to study the eﬀects of peer pressure on incentives, we compare the optimal contract
in the case without peer pressure to the case with peer pressure where the agency problem
remains.
With regard to agent 1, it is plain that ws¤
1 > ¯ ws¤
1 . This result implies that the incentive for
the more productive agent is less high-powered in the case with peer pressure than in the case
without peer pressure. The more productive agent suﬀers from the negative externality of peer
pressure when he devotes eﬀort as well as when he does not, because his eﬀort cost is below
his colleague’s in both cases. However, he can obviously reduce the negative externality of
peer pressure if he devotes his eﬀort. Therefore, the principal can induce the more productive
agent’s eﬀort even by means of such a low-powered incentive.
On the other hand, the eﬀect of peer pressure on the incentive for agent 2 depends on °.
If d2=d1 < 1+1=°, the incentive for the less productive agent is also less high-powered in the
case with peer pressure than in the case without (ws¤
2 > ¯ ws¤
2 ). Consequently, both agents’
incentives are weakened by peer pressure if d2=d1 < 1+1=°. However, if d2=d1 ¸ 1+1=°, the
incentive for the less productive agent is more high-powered in the case with peer pressure
(ws¤
2 · ¯ ws¤
2 ). In this way, ° as well as heterogeneity is also crucial to the optimal incentive
for him.8 When ° has a signiﬁcant eﬀect, the less productive agent suﬀers suﬃciently from
peer pressure even if he devotes eﬀort. Then, the principal has to provide a more high-
powered incentive to him in order to overcome the negative externality of peer pressure and
induce eﬀort. Thus, when the degree of heterogeneity is signiﬁcant, the principal must adjust
incentives in diﬀerent directions according to the type of agent.
5 The Eﬀects of Peer Pressure on Organizational Forms
This section studies whether the principal can save the payment to the agents by making use
of the eﬀects of peer pressure and we examine this issue in terms of the optimal organizational
forms. Suppose that there exist two more productive agents and two less productive agents
and that the principal has to divide these four agents into two groups each of which consists
of exactly two agents. Then, how should the principal allocate these agents to each of the
groups? In this situation, the principal can design two types of organizational forms: one is
8To conﬁrm that this result is really guaranteed, we have to show that there exists the range of d2=d1 such
that 1 + 1=° · d2=d1 < 1 + (l ¡ ®)=®(1 ¡ l). Then, such a range exists if (® + ®°)=(® + °) < l. There exist
some ° that satisfy this inequality when ® < l (< 1). Here, this inequality is more feasible if ° becomes larger
because (® + ®°)=(® + °) is decreasing in °.
6that she allocates the same type of agents to a same group (Form A); and the other is that
she allocates the diﬀerent type of agents to a same group (Form B). Note that we can see
that the latter has the form where there exist two groups with peer pressure and that the
former has the form where there exist two groups without peer pressure because there is no
peer pressure if two agents in the same group are homogeneous in terms of the productivity.
In this section, we again focus on the case where the agency problem remains, that is, the
case where ® < l and d2=d1 < 1 + (l ¡ ®)=®(1 ¡ l).
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d1 + d2 + ®f°d2 ¡ (2 + °)d1g
∆p
(9)
The expected payment to the agents when the principal chooses Form A is 2W ¤, while when
she chooses Form B is 2W
¤
. Therefore, we can conclude that the principal can save the
payments to the agents by the eﬀects of peer pressure if W ¤ > W
¤








Intuitively, the principal’s payment in Form A is smaller than that in Form B if the hetero-
geneity is so signiﬁcant that (10) cannot hold. However, when the heterogeneity is moderate
so that (10) holds, the room to save her payment appears by taking Form B rather than Form
A. Remembering the discussion in the previous section, we can understand this result when
d2
d1 < 1+ 1
° because the principal can weaken the incentives to both types of the agents by peer
pressure. In addition, (10) implies that the principal can also save the payments even when
she has to give the higher-powered incentive to the less productive agents to reduce the neg-
ative externality by peer pressure. The possibility that the principal can save the payment is
decreasing in °. Thus, the principal receives more beneﬁt from peer pressure when the agents
do not feel much peer pressure, that is, when his eﬀort cost is above his colleague’s cost. This
probability is also decreasing in l but increasing in ®. From this point, as peer pressure and
the cooperation between agents becomes signiﬁcant, the principal is more likely to be better
oﬀ by designing the organizational forms such that the agents feel peer pressure.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the eﬀects of peer pressure on optimal incentive schemes in the situation
where the heterogeneous agents receive a psychological payoﬀ from the comparison of their
7eﬀort costs. We show that optimal incentive schemes depend on parameters such as the degree
of peer pressure and that of heterogeneity of agents’ productivity levels. We additionally
examine the possibility that the principal can be better oﬀ by making use of the eﬀects
of peer pressure when she designs the organizational forms. Although our model seems to
be a simple and speciﬁc one, we can clearly illustrate the eﬀects of peer pressure among
heterogeneous agents. We hope that this paper is helpful in developing a more general model
of peer pressure, or more generally, the psychological eﬀects on incentives.
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